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Abstract— Consider a dynamic task allocation problem, where tasks are unknowingly distributed over an environment. This paper 
considers each task comprised of two sequential subtasks: detection and completion, where each subtask can only be carried out by a 
certain type of agent. We address this problem using a novel nature-inspired approach called “hunter and gatherer”. The proposed 
method employs two complementary teams of agents: one agile in detecting (hunters) and another dexterous in completing (gatherers) 
the tasks. To minimize the collective cost of task accomplishments in a distributed manner, a game-theoretic solution is introduced to 
couple agents from complementary teams. We utilize market-based negotiation models to develop incentive-based decision-making 
algorithms relying on innovative notions of “certainty and uncertainty profit margins”. The simulation results demonstrate that 
employing two complementary teams of hunters and gatherers can effectually improve the number of tasks completed by agents 
compared to conventional methods, while the collective cost of accomplishments is minimized.  In addition, the stability and efficacy of 
the proposed solutions are studied using Nash equilibrium analysis and statistical analysis respectively. It is also numerically shown that 
the proposed solutions function fairly, i.e. for each type of agent, the overall workload is distributed equally. 
 
Index Terms—Distributed multiagent system, dynamic task allocation, game theory, negotiation.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Multirobot systems are expected to undertake imperative roles in a wide variety of fields such as urban search and rescue (USAR) 
[1, 2], agricultural field operations [3], security patrols [4, 5], environmental monitoring [6], and industrial procedures[7]. Studies 
have shown that multi-robot systems have advantage over single-robot systems by offering more reliability, redundancy, and time 
efficiency when the nature of the tasks is inherently distributed [8]. Nonetheless, the problem of multi-robot task-allocation 
(MRTA) poses many critical challenges that has called for investigation in the past two decades [9-11]. In this regards, the 
complexity of MRTA problems increases significantly in a dynamic environment, where the number and location of tasks are 
unknown for agents [12, 13]. Thus, robots need to explore the environment to find tasks before accomplishing them. In real world 
problems, any robot designated to perform one of the tasks in [1-7] needs to be sufficiently dexterous which makes it relatively 
heavy and incapable of agile exploration. Having said that, the dynamic problem can be turned into a problem where each task is 
comprised of sequential subtasks, each possible to be done only by a certain type of agent. In that case, for each type of subtask, a 
robot team of appropriate type must be employed. This case poses an unexplored MRTA problem whose coupling and cooperation 
between those complementary teams is the motivation of this work.  
In the context of MRTA, notable attention has been devoted for revealing various aspects of dynamic problems [14-18]. For 
instance, [19] present a mathematical model of a general dynamic task allocation mechanism where robots use only local sensing 
and no direct communication is needed between them for task allocation. Disregarding the communication between agents is a 
deficiency where the information handled by the agents play an imperative role in the functionality of a decentralized multi-agent 
system in a dynamic environment. In this regard, [20] introduces a novel weighted synergy graph model to capture new interactions 
among agents. In the created model, agents work together at a task throughout communication where weight of the edge indicates 
the communication cost between agents. 
In contrast to the way that [20] utilizes the communication among agents, there are works employing communications among 
agents to frame negotiations among them. For instance, [21] pursues a decentralized game–theoretic approach in which planning 
is achieved via negotiation between agents. Although the results show that their approach is robust to restrictions on the agents’ 
communication and observation range, this work is not allowing agents to have differing costs for performing the same task which 
makes it inapplicable to a wide variety of real-world problems. On the other hand, [22] proposes a distributed market-based 
coordination algorithm in which agents are able to bid for task assignments considering each agent’s cost for accomplishment of 
tasks to address the dynamic MRTA problem. While in real world dynamic MRTA problems tasks are not fully-observable for all 
agents, the authors of this work assumed that the agents have knowledge of all tasks at a time. This assumption is too strong and 
does not completely reflects a dynamic environment’s situation. In this regards, [23] considers a real dynamic environment and 
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presents a real-time single item auction based task allocation method for the multi-robot exploration problem and investigate new 
bid evaluation strategies. 
While the works reviewed above [21-23] present different approaches to address a dynamic MRTA problem, they all similarly 
do not grant the agents the capabilities of developing the assignment algorithms. On this subject, [24] takes agents’ capabilities 
into account in order to form teams by developing a market-based novel task allocation method based on Gini coefficient. Although 
the authors demonstrated that the proposed method can effectively improve the number of tasks completed by robot’s system, the 
effect of cooperation and coupling between the formed teams is still uninvestigated. In a similar effort, [25] models agents’ 
capabilities as actions and utilizes single-round auction to form teams and then forms coordination between agents of a same team. 
In the same way, coupling and cooperation of the formed teams have left unexplored in this work, though the developed framework 
was able to successfully resolve the required allocation issues. By the same token, [26] models the multi-robot system as a 
community of species considering agents’ capabilities and then presents decentralized and centralized methods to efficiently 
control the heterogeneous teams of robots, regardless of interaction and collaboration between those teams. Given the review 
above, there is a lack of critical attention paid to the cooperation and coupling between robot teams, formed based on agents’ 
capabilities, to address a dynamic MRTA problem.  
This paper proposes a nature-inspired approach called “hunter and gatherer” which employs two teams of robots: a team of agile 
robots that can quickly explore an environment and detect tasks, called “hunters”; and a team of dexterous robots who accomplish 
detected tasks called “gatherers”. In fact, we are turning dynamic MRTA problems into a problem where each task is comprised 
of two sequential subtasks: exploration and completion. Considering, when there are synchronization and precedence (SP) 
constraints which specify an ordering constraint for time-extended assignment (TA) problems [27], the MRTA is referred to as a 
TA:SP problem [28]. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the MT-MR-TA:SP problem has not been tackled in the literature so 
far, while it is an ubiquitous problem in a wide variety of fields such as USAR, agricultural field operations etc. 
Consider the USAR in a disaster site in which a number of victims have got stranded in unknown locations and need immediate 
rescue operations. Each victim is a task that needs to be detected first and then rescued buy a rescue operation that typically needs 
several dexterity actions which make a rescue robot heavy and incapable of agile search operations. Hence, let us consider each 
task comprised of two sequential subtasks: detection and completion, where each subtask can only be carried out by a certain type 
of agent. Thus, the case encounters a ST-MR-TA:SP or MT-MR-TA:SP problem. In the USAR example, hunters can be a group 
of small UAVs which search the site to locate victims, and gatherers can be a group of maxi-sized [29] heavy-duty UGVs that 
rescue detected victims relying on their dexterity capabilities.  
According to the proposed hunter and gatherer scheme, we present a game-theoretic solution which considers coupling and 
cooperation between complementary agents divided into different teams by: 1) utilizing market-based negotiation models, auction 
[30-32] and reverse auction, and 2) introducing decentralized incentive-based decision-making algorithms. Proposed algorithms 
rely on new notions of certainty and uncertainty profit margins (CPM and UPM) that respectively determine the levels of 
confidence and conservativeness of each agent in negotiations to minimize the collective cost of task accomplishments. To enhance 
the effectiveness of proposed algorithms, a multitask-planning algorithm is invented for gatherer agents that enables them to queue 
multiple tasks in their action plan for finding the optimal solution for completing a group of tasks rather than doing one by one. 
We show that employing two complementary teams of hunters and gatherers can effectually improve the number of tasks 
completed by agents while the collective cost of accomplishments is minimized. Moreover, the stability and efficacy of the 
assignment algorithms are proven by a Nash equilibrium analysis and simulation experiments respectively. Besides, we 
investigated the distribution of workload, as the total costs and accomplishments of a mission, among agents and showed that the 
proposed algorithms function fairly, i.e. for each type of agent, the overall workload is distributed equally, and all agents of a same 
type behave analogously under similar characteristics. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: the problem statement and formulation are presented in Section II. In Section 
III, the methodology including conceptual frameworks, reasoning mechanisms, and algorithms are proposed. Nash equilibrium 
analysis is carried out in Section IV. In Section V, statistical analysis on simulation results are presented followed by a concluding 
discussion in Section VI.  
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In this section, the problem of hunter and gatherer mission planning (HGMP) in the context of dynamic MRTA is explained. 
Assume that there are m  tasks distributed randomly over the environment, E. We consider a case that the number and the locations 
of tasks are unknown for agents before the execution of the HGMP. The set of tasks is denoted as 
1{ ,..., }mT T=  in which each 
task is split into hunting and gathering subtasks, i.e. { , }h gk k kT t t=  with 1 k m  , where 
h
kt  and 
g
kt  represent hunting and gathering 
subtasks respectively. In this case, the set of agents is defined as { , }h gA A=  that comprises of two teams of hunters { }
h
h iA a=  
and gatherers { }gg jA a=  where 1 hi n   and 1 gj n  . The cost associated with 
h
ia   for accomplishment of 
h
kt  is denoted as ,
h
k ic  
and ,
g
k jc  is the cost associated with 
g
ja  for accomplishment of 
g
kt . 
Assumptions— throughout the paper, it is assumed that: 
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1) Tasks are stationary, i.e. they are fixed to their locations. 
2) The cost of accomplishment of each task is equal to the distance that an agent moves to do a task. An agent is considered done 
with a task when it reaches to the task’s location. 
3) All agents of a same team are identical. 
4) All agents are rational, i.e. they intend to maximize their expected utility.  
5) All agents are fully autonomous and have their own utility functions, i.e. no global utility function there exist. 
6) Agents from complementary teams can communicate with each other using a stably-connected network. 
 Now, the HGMP problem can be stated as follows. Suppose that there exists a tuple for the mission such that HGMP = (E, , 
).   denotes the assignment function which assigns m tasks to 
h gn n n= +  agents such that : . Under the assumptions 
1-6, the global objective   is to minimize the collective cost of  : 
, ,
,  
1 1 1 1
min
gh
ji
k k
nn m m
h i g j
h k i k g k j k
x y
i k j k
c x c y 
= = = =
  
 = + 
 
  ,                (1) 
where i
kx  and 
j
ky  are binary decision variables for 
h
kt  and 
g
kt : 
{1,0}  ,ikx i k                                  (2) 
{1,0}  ,jky j k  .                               (3) 
In (1), weighting parameters 
h  and g  are introduced to sum relative collective costs of complementary teams, because of the 
physical differences of each type. 
This problem has a global objective   which can be achieved by determining the binary decision variables optimally. These 
variables need to be determined by the agents throughout explorations and negotiations in a distributed manner. Since agents are 
rational, each agent’s objective is to maximize its own expected utility. As a consequence, the objectives of agents may be 
conflicting during the HGMP. Hence, the methodology should be developed so that handles these conflicts in order to maximize 
the effectiveness of the HGMP and achieve the global objective  .    
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Conceptual Frameworks 
Hunters are assigned to explore the unknown environment. There is 
hI  as the incentive reward for a hunter, denoted as 
h
ia , who 
detects a task, denoted as 
kT . However, the detected task can only be completed by cooperation with a gatherer. Thus, an extra 
incentive is added for motivating agents from complementary teams to build up a cooperation, denoted as 
exI . Hunters and 
gatherers involve in negotiation processes to reach agreements for completing the tasks and sharing 
exI  between themselves. In a 
negotiation, a hunter who has detected a task on one side and one or more gatherers on the other side are involved. An agreement 
determines which gatherer is assigned to complete the detected task and how much is its share from the  
exI . Let us denote 
,0 1
h
k iP   and , ,1
g h
k j k iP P= −  as the proportions that 
h
ia  and 
g
ja  receive from exI  for accomplishment of kT  respectively. Also, the 
gatherer who completes the detected task receives 
gI  as a gathering incentive, when the task is completed. Since all agents are 
rational, they intend to maximize their incentives by accomplishing more tasks through building up more cooperation. 
To establish the process by which agents come into an agreement, we define an online board on which each hunter announces 
the location of its new detection to find gathering partners for starting a negotiation process. Each gatherer follows the 
announcements on the online board to choose a waiting hunter for negotiation by analyzing the location information shared by 
each waiting hunter. A gatherer then sends a readiness message to the chosen hunter to start a negotiation. 
We consider two possible scenarios in order to develop reasoning mechanisms for agents to negotiate and cooperate: (1) a 
waiting hunter receives only one readiness message, and (2) the waiting hunter receives more than one readiness messages. The 
first scenario resembles the bargaining or reverse auction process as there is only one buyer who aims to bargain for finding the 
most affordable option. The second scenario is similar to an auction process where usually there are more than one buyer interested 
in a specific object. We utilize these two market-based methods as negotiation models between negotiating agents. in addition, it 
is possible that the number of waiting hunters on the board, denoted as h
wn , be more than one. In that case, the question that how a 
gatherer chooses a hunter among h
wn  waiting agents, is addressed in subsection 3.E. For the time being, we assume that gatherers 
already know how to choose a partner and we focus on the negotiation reasoning mechanisms.  
Fundamentals of reasoning mechanisms are discussed in the next subsection, and next we will explain how agents rely on their 
reasoning mechanisms to behave in the reverse auction and auction scenarios in subsection 3.C and 3.D respectively.   
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B. Reasoning Mechanism 
In this subsection, reasoning mechanisms for both hunters and gatherers are developed to establish their behavior during a 
mission that determines the way that they communicate, negotiate, and cooperate. Since fundamentals of reasoning mechanisms 
are similar for both type of agents, for the sake of brevity, we consider a general agent  defined as 
za
  with { , }h g  , where 
1 z n  .  
Moving on, it is time to introduce the CPM and UPM for 
za
 . CPM is a circular margin with radius of 
cR
  in which 
za
  is certain 
about a profitable agreement even if its share in 
exI  is zero. UPM is a circular margin, between two concentric circles with radiuses 
of 
uR
  and 
cR
 ,  in which 
za
  is uncertain about making a profit in an agreement, i.e. its profit strongly depends on its proportion 
of 
exI . Further, za
  cannot make any profit beyond its UPM even if it receives 
exI  entirely.   
Fig. 1 shows the CPM and UPM as two concentric circles with 
za
  as the center. The agent compares its cost for accomplishing 
the task with its CPM and UPM to realize its state to make profitable decisions during the negotiation. 
Subsequent statements explain the states of 
za
  with respect to its cost for accomplishing 
kt
 : 
- State 1: if ,k z cc R
  , then 
za
 can make a profit regardless of its proportion of 
exI . 
- State 2: if ,c k z uR c R
    ,  then the profit of 
za
 depends on its proportion of 
exI . 
- State 3: if ,k z uc R
  , then 
za
 cannot make any profit even if it receives all of 
exI . 
We formulize the CPM and UPM for 
za
  by defining 
cR
  and 
uR
 . If 
za
  accomplishes 
kt
 , then it receives I  as an incentive. 
Since 
za
  is certain about receiving I , we have cR I

 . Hence, we define cR
  by introducing   as a scaling parameter for the 
CPM: 
cR I

 =              (4) 
In addition, 
za
  receives a proportion of 
exI  that will be determined by the negotiation process so za
  is uncertain about its share 
of 
exI . Thus, we define uR
  by introducing   as a scaling parameter for the UPM: 
u c exR R I
 
= +       (5) 
Altogether, for 
za
  involved in a negotiation, the utility function defined below determines its payoff.  
Definition 1 (utility function). ( )kU t


 gives the profit earned by 
za
  for accomplishing 
kt
  and building up a cooperation. The 
utility function of 
za
  is defined as: 
 
 
Fig. 1.  CPM and UPM. 
1T  and 2T  are in agent’s CPM and UPM, respectively. 3T  is beyond agent’s uncertainty boundary. 
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, ,( ) ( )k k z ex k zU t I P I c
  
    = + −                  (6) 
Now, we define a profit interval for 
za
 , regarding its state for accomplishing 
kt
 , by which it evaluates its results in a negotiation. 
A profit interval is an interval for ,k zP
  that guarantees the negotiation’s profitability. According to the assumption 4, 
za
  wants to 
maximize its payoff so in each negotiation, 
za
  definitely makes a non-negative profit, such that: 
, , 0k z ex k zI P I c
 
    −+          (7) 
That can be written as: 
1
, ,( )( )k z ex k zc I I P
 
   
−−         (8) 
The overlap of ,0 1k zP
    and (8) yields the profit interval for ,k zP
 . The overlap in all three states are expressed in the following. 
If 
za
  is in state 1, then ,k zc I

   and the left side of (8) is negative. Hence, the overlap is  ,0 1k zP
  , i.e. in state 1, 
za
  makes 
a profit regardless of its share in 
exI . If za
  is in state 2, then we have ,k zc I

  . Therefore, the overlap gives 
1
, ,( )( ) 1k z ex k zc I I P
 
   
−−   . And if 
za
  is in state 3, then we have ,k z exc I I

    +  so the left side of (8) is greater than one. 
Hence, the overlap of (8) and ,0 1k zP
   is null set, i.e. the task is not profitable. Accordingly, the profit interval of 
za
  for 
accomplishing 
kt
  is defined as [ , ]low uppi L L
 
 =  where lowL
  and upL
  denote lower and upper bounds respectively. 
C. The First Scenario: Reverse Auction 
Consider the scenario shown in Fig. 2(a) and suppose that h
ia  has detected kT  at the cost of ,
h
k ic , it has posted an announcement 
on the online board, and it receives a readiness message only from gja . This message is a request for quotation message, i.e. 
h
ia  
offers a proportion for sharing the 
exI  and 
g
ja  decides to accept or reject the offer. Accordingly, we explain how 
h
ia  makes offers 
and gja  makes an acceptance or rejection decision, using the proposed reasoning mechanisms. 
According to the process illustrated in Fig. 3, h
ia  calculates the lower bound, midpoint, and the upper bound of its profit interval 
for making 3 offers. Since h
ia  is making offers to 
g
ja , it should send offers using , ,1
g h
k j k iP P= − , as the following: 
,O = (1- )
k h
i j lowL , ,
1
O = 1 (  - )
2
k h h
i j up lowL L − , and ( ),O = 1k hi j upL − .      (9) 
According to Fig. 3, at the first decision node, h
ia  makes an offer regarding the explained process, and then at the second step, 
 
Fig. 2.  Possible scenarios: (a) reverse auction scenario, and (b) auction scenario. 
  
 
Fig. 3.  The reverse auction process. 
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g
ja  decides to accept or reject the offer. Algorithm 1 illustrates the bargaining procedure for 
h
ia . In this algorithm, 
g
canda denotes 
the gatherer agent that has sent the readiness message. On line 3 in Algorithm 1, , , ,[ , , ]
k k k
i j i j i jO O O   is assigned to vector “offers” in a 
random order. 
Besides, gja  uses its own profit interval to make an acceptance or rejection decision. For each received offer made by 
h
ia , if the 
offer is inside the 
gpi , then 
g
ja  accepts the offer. Otherwise, it rejects the offer. 
D. The Second Scenario: Auction 
Consider the auction scenario shown in Fig. 2(b) and suppose that h
ia  has detected kT  at cost ,
h
k ic , it has posted an announcement 
on the online board and receives readiness messages from 2bn    gatherers. In this case, 
h
ia  holds an auction and selects the winner, 
where gatherers bid for sharing 
exI  to win the detected task and complete it.  Accordingly, both types of agents’ reasoning 
mechanism need to be investigated. 
We utilize the “second-price sealed-bid auction” [33] as the negotiation framework in which the winning bidder is an agent who 
has placed the highest bid and it pays the amount equal to the second highest bid to the hunter holding the auction. In this auction, 
g
ja , a gatherer bidding in the auction, can bid its valuation. Since it won’t pay as much as it bids if it wins, 
g
ja  still has a chance 
to get a positive benefit from the auction. Therefore, truthful bidding is an optimal strategy in a second-price auction. To that end, 
we explain how gja  bids using its profit intervals first and then we discuss the way that 
h
ia  chooses the winning bidder. 
g
ja  bids 
its valuation that is the lowest bound of its profit interval. Since gja  is making an offer to 
h
ia  by bidding, it should send the bid 
using , ,1
h g
k i k jP P= − , as following: 
, (1 )
k g
j i lowb L= − .                           (10) 
Besides, h
ia chooses the winner bidder after a single round of bidding. First, 
h
ia  chooses the winning bidder, 
g
wa ,  regarding the 
maximum bid among the set of bids, denoted as b, such that:  
argsmax(b)w =                             (11) 
Secondly, h
ia  checks if the second highest bid satisfies a minimum acceptable bid determined by its profit interval. Since the share 
of h
ia  in exI  must satisfy (7), the minimum acceptable bid is the lower bound, 
h
lowL , of its profit interval, such that:  
max hj w j lowb L                              (12) 
E. Multitask-planning 
In Fig. 4, suppose that 
1
ha  has detected 2T . 2
ga  is the only gatherer agent that can send a readiness message to start a negotiation 
with 
1
ha  because 1
ga  is busy with gathering 1T . In this case, 2 2
g gt a→  is an inefficient planning where 2,1 2,2
g gc c .  
Alternatively, if 
1
ga  was able to plan for multiple tasks at a time, it could gather 2T  at a lower cost. Accordingly, to prevent such 
ineffective plannings in the HGMP, in the following, a multitask-planning algorithm for gatherers is proposed. 
 
Algorithm 1 bargaining function for a hunter agent 
1:  function bargain ( ,
h
k ic  , h , h , 
g
canda ) 
2:       
hpi    calculate [ , ]
h h
low upL L  
3:       offers    calculate offers: , , ,[ , , ]
k k k
i j i j i jO O O   
4:       for each offer do 
 5:             send the offer to g
canda  
6:             if an acceptance message is received then 
7:                   results [ ,offer]gcanda  
8:                   break for 
9:             else 
10:                   results   
11:             end if 
12:       end for  
13: return results 
 
 
  
7 
Let us define an action plan in which gja  queues multiple tasks to accomplish in future such that: 1{ ,..., }j q  = , where maxq q  
with 
maxq  as the maximum number of tasks that gatherers can queue. Each task has a profile in gatherer’s action plan containing 
required information: , , ,{ , , , }
g g g g
q k k j k j k jt c c P = , where ,
g
k jc  denotes the temporary cost calculated by the agent for 
g
kt . 1  through q  
are the tasks that gja  is already planned to accomplish (actual tasks). In addition, j  denotes the path that 
g
ja  follows to accomplish 
j . Now, assume that 
g
ja   wants to add a new task to j  as 1i + , when maxq q . The first step is choosing a waiting hunter and 
the second step is negotiating with the chosen agent. The negotiation processes have been discussed before so here we focus on 
the procedure that gja  chooses a waiting hunter to fill up j . 
The proposed method relies on the CPM and UPM to develop gatherers’ reasoning mechanism so that gja  fills up j   effectually. 
To that end, a three-step process in which gja  chooses a waiting hunter agent for negotiation is proposed. Before starting the 
process, gja  follows the online board and lists the waiting hunters in 
h
waitingA  ordered by their waiting time, i.e. the oldest is the first 
in the list. Process’ steps are elaborated in the following: 
Step 1) gja  considers the most prior task from 
h
waitingA , denoted as candT . Then, 
g
ja  plans the shortest multi-destination temporary 
path, using A* search algorithm [34], denoted as 
j
 , to gather all tasks in j  plus candT . When j  is generated, the temporary 
cost of each task must be updated in each task’s profile. 
Step 2) gja  verifies the feasibility of making a profit from candT . Thus, it checks whether candT  is in state 3 regarding the j . If 
candT  is not in state 3, then 
g
ja  goes to the next step. Otherwise, 
g
ja  withdraws candT  and starts over from the first step. 
Step 3) gja  examines the effect of choosing candT  on the actual tasks in j . When 
g
ja  generates j  in step 1, it may have 
, ,
g g
k j k jc c  for the actual tasks in j . For this reason, 
g
ja  checks whether (7) is still true for newly calculated temporary costs for 
each actual task. If (7) is true for all actual tasks, 
candT  is verified for starting a negotiation process; otherwise, 
g
ja  withdraws candT  
and starts over from the first step. 
Algorithm 2 illustrates the multitask-planning procedure for gja . This algorithm is developed as a function for choosing a 
candidate task detected by a waiting hunter by considering 
j . Not to mention, the output of this algorithm is not a task in agent’s 
action plan, i.e. 
1q + . The output is a candidate task detected by a waiting hunter that potentially can be added to j  as 1q +  
depending on the negotiation process.    
 
Fig. 4.  An example explaining the necessity of multi-tasking capability of gatherer agents. 
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Fig. 5 illustrates an example in which 
1
ga  fills out its action plan where max 5q = . All sequences happen before accomplishing 
1 . In sequence 1, 1
ga  has already 1  in its action plan and chooses 1CT  to negotiate. In sequence 2, 1
ga  has reached an agreement 
for accomplishing 
1CT  and adds it to its action plan as 2 . Moreover, there are two candidates and it chooses 2CT  to negotiate 
because 
3CT  is not feasible and fails to satisfy the condition mentioned in step 2. In sequence 3, 1
ga  has reached an agreement for 
accomplishing 
2CT  and adds it to its action plan as 3 . In addition, there are two candidate tasks namely 4CT  and 5CT . 5CT  cannot 
be verified in step 3, though it’s feasible itself and passes step 2. Therefore, 
1
ga  chooses 4CT  for negotiation. In sequence 4, 1
ga  
has reached an agreement for accomplishing 
4CT  and adds it to its action plan as 4 . Moreover, it chooses 6CT  to negotiate because 
it passes all 3 steps. Although choosing 
6CT  causes change in the path to 2T , but it does not bring 1
ga  into state 3 for 2T .   
Algorithm 2 Multitask-planning 
1:   function ChoosePartner (
j , g  ,  g , maxq , 
online_board) 
2:       
h
waitingA   list and sort waiting hunters. 
3:       for each hunter in 
h
waitingA g  do 
4:             h
canda    the selected waiting hunter  
5:             
candT    the task detected by 
h
canda   
6:             
j
   generate a path to do j  and candT  
 7:             update 
j  with newly calculated costs 
8:             if gja  is not in state 3 for candT  then 
9:                   validation_flag true  
10:                   for 
1  to q  do 
11:                         if , ,
g g
g g g k j ex k jI P I c   +  then 
12:                               validation_flag false  
13:                         end if 
14:                   end for  
15:             end if 
16:             if validation_flag==true then 
17:                   [ , ]hcand candresults a T  
18:                   break for    
19:             end if 
20:       end for 
21: return results  
 
  
 
Fig. 5.  An example of multitask-planning by a gatherer agent 
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F. Decision-Making Algorithms 
First, we propose a distributed decision-making algorithm determining the exploration, detection, and negotiating procedure for 
h
ia  in the HGMP. Algorithm 3 illustrates the decision-making procedure for 
h
ia . In each iteration, 
h
ia  explores the environment to 
detect a task. When h
ia  detects a task, denoted as detectedT , it announces the location on the online board and waits to receive readiness 
messages. According to the number of readiness messages that h
ia  receives, it starts a reverse auction or auction negotiation process 
to reach an agreement. If h
ia  reaches an agreement, then it start exploring the environment again. Otherwise, 
h
ia  announces its 
detection on the online board again and does the same procedure.   denotes the iteration number and 
max  denotes the maximum 
iterations in a mission.    
Algorithm 3 decision-making outer-loop algorithm of h
ia  
1:  for 
max1: =  do  
2:       if hold == false then 
3:             explore the environment 
4:             if a new task is detected then 
 5:                   
detected the new detected taskT    
6:                   hold true   
7:             end if 
8:       end if 
9:       if   hold == true then 
10:             Announce 
detectedT  on the online board 
11:             if one readiness message is received then  
12:                   bargain 
13:             else if readiness messages >1 then 
14:                   hold an auction 
15:             end if 
16:             if the negotiation is succeeded then 
17:                   hold false  
18:                   mark the task as accomplished 
19:             end if 
20:       end if 
21: end for 
  
Algorithm 4 decision-making outer-loop algorithm of a gatherer 
agent 
1:  for 
max1: =  do 
2:       if  
maxq q  then 
3:             [ , ] choose partnerhcand canda T   
4:             if h
canda    then 
 5:                   send the readiness message to h
canda  
6:                   if received a bargaining notification then 
7:                         bargain 
8:                   else 
9:                         place a bid for the auction 
10:                   end if 
11:             end if 
12:             if the negotiation is succeeded then 
13:                   add 
candT   to j  as 1q +   
14:                  j j     
15:             end if 
16:       end if 
17:       follow 
j  to accomplish tasks and update j   
18: end for 
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Secondly, we present a distributed decision-making algorithm determining negotiating and accomplishment procedure in the 
HGMP for gja  regarding the explained reasoning mechanisms. Algorithm 4 illustrates the decision-making procedure for 
g
ja . In 
each iteration, when 
maxq q , 
g
ja  manages its action plan by calling the “choose partner” function first and then negotiate with the 
chosen hunter upon availability. If the negotiation is succeeded, then it adds the new task to 
j  and updates j . Moreover, in 
each iteration, gja  follows j  to gather tasks in j . When a task is gathered, 
g
ja  updates j  by removing the accomplished task.  
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
It is important to study the stability of the proposed algorithms to ensure that agents do not have motivation to change their 
behavior during the HGMP, i.e. to make sure that agents can make optimal decisions in the scenarios and do not vacillate in 
negotiations and task accomplishments. In this section we study the stability of the proposed algorithms in both reverse auction 
and auction scenarios.  
A. The First Scenario: Reverse Auction 
Consider a hunter and a gatherer agent whose preferences over outcomes are given by the utility functions ( )hh kU t  and ( )
g
g kU t  
respectively. As shown in Fig. 3, the model in which agents negotiate in the first scenario is a simplified reverse auction or 
bargaining process. According to the assumption 6, each agent obtains sufficient information about all actions and utilities. Thus, 
the model turns into a perfect-information extensive form game which resembles a sharing game. We know that Every (finite) 
perfect-information game in extensive form has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) [35]. However, existence of PSNE does 
not necessarily ensure that the output of the first scenario is a PSNE. It strongly depends on the decision-making algorithm of each 
agent. Therefore, we need to prove if the output of the proposed reasoning mechanisms in the first scenario is a PSNE.  
According to the proposed reasoning mechanisms, each agent calculates a profit interval to make the most profitable decision. 
To be specific, h
ia  makes its best response by making offers that fall into its profit interval. Similarly, 
g
ja  makes its best response 
to the scenario by accepting the offers within its profit interval. In other words, the decision of each agent is its best possible 
response to the scenario, and it knows that the counterpart agent is also making its best response. We know that the strategy profile 
in which each agent is making its best response to other agent is a PSNE [35]. Consequently, the HGMP’s outcome is a PSNE in 
the first scenario.   
Although the model itself ensures the existence of PSNE and the reasoning mechanisms’ outcome is a PSNE, the desirability of 
PSNE is still a considerable concern. The following numerical example explains the details on how scaling parameters can affect 
PSNE in the first scenario. 
In the reverse auction scenario, pure strategies for h
ia  and 
g
ja  are defined as: , , ,O ,O ,O{ }
k k k
h i j i j i jS  =  and {( ),( ),gS AAA AAR=
( ),( ),( ),ARA ARR RAA ( ),( , , ),RAR R R A ( )}RRR , respectively, where A and R stand for acceptance and rejection actions of 
g
ja  
respectively. Now, let assume that 10h g exI I I= = = , 1h h = = , and 1g g = = . If we have , 8
h
k hc =  and , 10
g
k jc =  for 
accomplishing 
kT , then offers are calculated from (9), as follows: ,O 0
k
i j = , ,O 5
k
i j
 = , and ,O 10
k
i j
 = . Hence, {(A, A, A), offer1} is 
one of the equilibria, i.e. gja  accepts the first offer which results ( ) 0
g
g kU t  . On the other hand, if we only change scaling 
parameters of gja  such that 0.9g g = = , then {(A, A, A), offer1} is no longer a PSNE. Instead, {(R, R, R), offer1} is a PSNE, 
i.e. gja  rejects the first offer. In conclusion, the desirability of PSNE in the first scenario can be guaranteed by designating 
appropriate scaling parameters 
h , h , g , and g . 
B. The Second Scenario: Auction 
In the second scenario, we investigate the existence of NE by a theorem based on the CPM and UPM concepts. We investigate 
3 conditions to find the NE in an auction process. We will prove the theorem by contradiction, i.e. we show that no agent, involving 
in an auction scenario, has a motivation to deviate from a strategy profile which satisfies all 3 conditions.      
Theorem 1. Consider the HGMP in the second scenario associated with the second-price sealed-bid auction with participation 
of hunter and gatherers whose preferences over outcome are given by the utility functions ( )hh kU t  and ( )
g
g kU t , respectively. Then 
b  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for argsmax(b)w =  conditions (i) and (ii), and for the hunter agent condition (iii) be satisfied:  
(i) j w ,max ( )
g
g g g ex k j wI I c b  + −  , i.e. the winner submitted a sufficiently high bid. 
(ii) ,max
g
j w j g g g ex k wb I I c   + − , i.e. the winner’s valuation is sufficiently high. 
(iii) , , 0( )
h h
h h h k i ex k iI P I c  + −  , i.e. the second highest bid satisfies the minimum bid determined by the hunter. 
Proof. if (i) does not hold, ,max ( )
g
j w g g g ex k j wI I c b  + −  , then 
g
j wa   has an interval to increase its bid, ,[ , ]
g g
low k wk P , in which it 
can lower its share to g
lowk  and place even a higher bid than wb  and win the auction. Hence, 
g
j wa   has a motivation to deviate and 
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increase its payoff. If (ii) does not hold, ,max
g
j w j g g g ex k wb I I c   + − , then for 
g
wa , denoted as the winner, we have ( ) 0
g
g kU t  , 
i.e. its payoff is negative. Therefore, it can deviate by submitting a losing bid and increasing its payoff to 0. Finally, if (iii) does 
not hold, , , 0( )
h h
h h h k i ex k iI P I c  + − , then the hunter agent’s payoff is negative for the second highest bid. Thus, it can deviate by 
rejecting all bids and increase its payoff to 0 because it has a strong motivation to hold another auction at the following iterations 
and avoid a negative pay off. ■ 
Nevertheless, existence of NE does not necessarily ensure that the scenario’s output is a NE. It strongly depends on the decision-
making algorithm of each agent. In this regard, we know that each gatherer involving in the auction scenario places a bid according 
to (10). That means, each gatherer agent bids its own valuation, i.e. 
j jb v= . Accordingly, conditions (i) and (ii) are always true 
because not only the winner has placed the highest bid among all bidders, but also it does not have a negative payoff. Besides, the 
hunter agent is using (11) to choose the winning bidder and (12) to verify the minimum requirement satisfaction of the second 
highest bid. Hence condition (iii) is also true. As a conclusion, according to Theorem 1 and also the decision-making algorithms 
of all agents participating in an auction, the result of the auction scenario is a NE. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we present simulation results to: 1) validate the fairness of the proposed algorithms, i.e. to ensure that the overall 
workload is distributed equally among agents of both type of agent, by comparing agents’ effectiveness in a set of experiments and 
analyzing the results by paired T-test and ANOVA [36] methods, 2) study the effect of profit margins on the total effectiveness of 
the HGMP, 3) demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed multitask-planning algorithm for gatherers by investigating its effect on 
the HGMP’s total effectiveness, and 4) to verify the functionality of the hunter and gatherer scheme, i.e. considering each task 
comprised of two sequential exploration and completion subtasks, by a comparison between the HGMP and a basic alternative 
method in which each agent does both hunting and gathering tasks itself.   
To simulate the proposed approaches, we developed a multi-robot simulation platform in MATLAB from scratch. In this 
platform, we can implement the simulations on any custom map, while the number of each type of agent is adjustable. We provide 
some basic functions for each type of agent to enable them maneuver over the determined environment. For gatherers, we utilized 
A*-based motion planning algorithm which enable them to move along two points in a grid environment. In addition, we provided 
a basic frontier-based exploration algorithm [37] for hunters. Besides, the number of tasks is also adjustable while the get located 
randomly over the environment. As a matter of fact, we also provided the perpetual mode for implantation of the simulations where 
for each gathered task another task will be distributed randomly in the environment. Accordingly, at each iteration there are certain 
number of tasks available in the environment which is adjustable for each mission. Further, in the perpetual mode, each explored 
and known grid of the environment turns into an unknown grid after certain iterations. The perpetual mode helps the analysis be 
done in a much more accurate and evidence-based way. 
All simulations have been executed under the following conditions: 1) the environment is sectioned as a 
L We e   gird of tiles 
where 100L We e= = , 2) the quantities of each type of agents are adjusted as 4hn = and 2gn = , 3) there are always 50pm =  tasks 
in the environment, 4) the maximum number of iterations is determined as  
max 1000 = ,  5) the rewards are assigned to be h gI I= =
140exI = , and 6) we considered the weighting parameters as 0.2
h
g


= . 
A. Fairness of the HGMP     
To demonstrate that the accomplishment workload is distributed equally for each type of agent, the concept of fairness is 
introduced. To that end, we define an effectiveness factor for each agent of both types based on their costs and accomplishment. 
Then, using the statistical analysis, we prove the fairness of the HGM by comparing effectiveness of different agents of each type. 
Let h
i  and 
h
i  denote the effectiveness of 
h
ia  and the number of tasks hunted by the agent respectively, as the following: 
,
1
h
h i
i m
h i
k i k
k
c x


=
=

.                             (13) 
Similarly, gj  and 
g
j  denote the effectiveness of 
g
ja  and the total number of tasks gathered by the agent respectively, such that: 
,
1
g
jg
j m
g j
k j k
k
c y


=
=

.                             (14) 
Fig. 6(a) shows the statistical results of  h
i  for all hunters in 200 missions. As 2hn  , an ANOVA test has been applied to the 
collected data to statistically prove the fairness of the HGMP for hunters. The ANOVA test has been applied as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4:  
h h h hH    = = = , 1 1:  
h h
iH   , and 0.05 = , where 
h
i  denotes the average of 
h
i  for 
h
ia  in 200 tests and   denotes the 
significance level. According to the results of the ANOVA test: 0.377F = , 2.61F crit− = , and 0.77P value− = . Since 
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F F crit −  and  P value −   we have to retain the null hypothesis. Thus, it has been proved that:
1 2 3 4
h h h h   = = =  which means 
that there is no significant difference between averages of hunters’ effectiveness in 200 tests.  
In addition, as 2gn = , a paired T-test has been applied to the data to investigate the fairness of the HGMP for gatherers. The 
hypothesis testing has been done in such a manner: 
0 1 2 0:  - =D
g gH   , 1 1 2 0:  - D
g gH    , 0 0D = , 200sn = , 199dof = , and 0.05 =
. According to the test, 0.315p value− = . Since p value −   we must retain the null hypothesis. Therefore, it has been proven 
that: 
1 2 0- 0
g g D  = =  as it is illustrated in Fig. 6 (b), which means that there is no significant difference between averages of 
gatherers’ effectiveness in 200 tests. 
Both statistical analysis indicate that all agents of a same type behave analogously under similar characteristics. In fact, this 
analysis numerically validates the Nash equilibrium analysis proved for the HGMP. It means that if the fairness concept 
investigated above is not valid for the HGMP and favors certain agents unfairly, then there are strong motivations for other agents 
to deviate from the proposed negotiation structure.  
B. Effect of Agents’ Profit Margins on Mission’s Effectiveness 
The effects of scaling parameters of profit margins,
g , g , h , and h , on the total effectiveness of the HGMP need to be 
investigated in order to show the functionality of CPM and UPM for both types of agents. To that end, we define an effectiveness 
factor for the HGMP, 
t , which is the ratio of the total number of completed tasks, t , and the collective cost of the whole mission, 
tC , as follows: 
, ,
1 1 1 1
gh
nn m m
h i g j
t h k i k g k j k
i k j k
C c x c y 
= = = =
= +                 (15) 
1
gn
g
t j
j
 
=
=                         (16) 
T
t
TC

 =  .                    (17) 
We ran the algorithms for all values of 
g  and g  that are multiples of 0.025 such that 0 0.5g   and 0 0.5g  , while 
0.35h h = = . t  has been calculated for each set of values for g  and g  as illustrated in Fig. 7. According to the results, t  is 
vanishingly small when 0.2g g +   that means agents cannot reach an agreement for completing the detected tasks. Further, t  
reaches its maximum when 0.2 0.5g g  +  . Next, t  falls gradually when 0.5g g +   because each gatherer’s CMP and 
UPM are large so that the agent does not fall into the State 3 and easily reach any agreement. As a result, each gatherer accomplishes 
a significant number of tasks inefficiently which reduces 
t . 
In the same way, we ran the algorithms for all values of 
h  and h   that are multiples of 0.05 such that 0 1h   and 0 1h 
,  while 0.15g g = = . t  has been calculated for each set of values for h  and h , as illustrated in Fig. 8. Accordingly, t  is too 
low when 0.4h g +   approximately, that means the CMP and UMP of hunters are too small and only a few agreements are 
reached. Then, for 0.4h g +  , t  increases gradually to reach its maximum and then again decreases. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  investigating the fairness of the HGMP for: (a) hunter agents, and (b) gatherer agents. Statistically, for each type of agents, there is no significant difference 
in agents’ effectiveness that demonstrates the fairness of the HGMP. 
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According to the proposed reasoning mechanism, when scaling parameter of an agent’s CPM decreases, the agent gets less 
confident. And when the scaling parameter of an agent’s UPM increases, the agent gets less conservative. In this regard, for both 
types of agents, the best strategy to reach the maximum of 
t  is neither being completely confident nor being fully conservative, 
but a combination of both leads to the optimum result.     
The oblique yellow area in Fig. 7(b), exposing the maximum values of 
t , is much narrower than the one in Fig. 8(b). It shows 
that the CPMs and UPMs of gatherers have more distinct influence on 
t  than the ones of hunters. The rationale behind this 
dissimilarity is that hunters rely on their CMPs and UPMs after hunting a task, i.e. they accomplish a task and then consider them 
only for finding a gatherer to complete the task. On the other hand, gatherers consider their CPMs and UMPs before gathering a 
task, i.e. before any accomplishment.  Consequently, this difference causes a much more distinct influence of gatherers’ CMPs and 
UPMs on 
t . 
C. The Effect of Multitask-planning on the HGMP’s Effectiveness 
In this section we aim to study the effect of the proposed multi-task planning algorithm for gathers on the total effectiveness of 
the HGMP defined in (17). Accordingly, we investigate the effect of 
maxq , which is the queue size of each gatherer, on t . To that 
end, we ran 200 missions for each value of 
maxq , varying from 1 to 10, and measured t  in each mission, as Fig. 9 illustrates the 
results. 
To understand how much 
t  increase when maxq  changes from max 1q =  to max 10q = , we applied a paired T-test to the two of 
collected data sets. The first data set contains 200 measures of 
t  for max 1q = , and the second data set comprises 200 measures of 
t  for max 10q = . The test has been conducted considering: 0 2 1 0:  H D −  ,  1 2 1 0:  H D −  , 0 10.7D = , 200sn = , 199dof = , 
and 0.05 =  where 1  and 2  denote the average of t  for the first and second data sets respectively. According to the test result, 
0.0004p value− = , 3.39t = , and 
0.05,199 1.65t = . Since 0.05,199t t  and p value −   we reject 0H . Therefore, the results prove that 
t  increases more than 70% by changing maxq  from 1 to 10. Moreover, the results also show that the HGMP remains fair for 
gatherer agents by increasing 
maxq . Fig. 10 demonstrates that there is no significant difference between effectiveness of two 
gatherers for each value of 
maxq .  
 
Fig. 7.  Investigating the effect of gatherers’ CPM and UPM on the HGMP’s effectiveness 
t : (a) the contour plot of the results using a polynomial curve-fitting, 
and (b) polynomial curve-fitting. 
  
 
Fig. 8.  The effect of hunters’ CPM and UPM on the HGMP’s effectiveness 
t : (a) the contour plot of the results using a polynomial curve-fitting, and (b) 
polynomial curve-fitting. 
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Besides, Fig. 11 shows that how the HGMP’s total effectiveness converges for different values of 
maxq  in such a manner: max 1q =
, 
max 4q = , and max 10q = . According to the results, by increasing the value of maxq , t  becomes more variant and the convergence 
time decreases, while 
t  enhances significantly as was proven before.  
D. Functionality Validation of the HGMP by a Comparison 
 In this section we are intended to analyze the functionality of the proposed hunter and gatherer scheme. As discussed before, 
we consider a dynamic problem to be a TA:SP problem where each task is comprised of two sequential detection and completion 
subtasks. Although we have discussed different aspects of the proposed approach in the previous sections, here we want to 
explicitly compare the proposed approached with an alternative approach in which  there is only one type of agent doing both 
exploration and completion of tasks together. 
 
Fig. 9.  Investigating the effect of 
maxq  on t . The results show a significant increase in t  when we increase maxq  from 1 to 10. 
  
 
Fig. 10.  fairness of the HGMP for gatherer agents for each value of 
maxq . The results demonstrate that the workload is still distributed equally on both gatherers 
when 
maxq  increases. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.  the convergence of the HGMP’s total effectiveness for 
max 1q = , max 4q = , and max 10q = , during max 1000 =  iterations. 
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According to the rationale behind the hunter and gatherer approach, hunters must be more agile and cost-efficient in exploration 
and maneuvering. Therefore, we first plotted the total effectiveness of the HGMP with respect to h g   which ranges from 
h g  , i.e. 0h g  = , to h g  , i.e. 1h g  = . Secondly, we ran the explained alternative approach to be able to judge the 
HGMP’s functionality. Since in this approach there is no hunter and gatherer scheme, we only have one type of agent and the 
obtained total effectiveness is dependent from this ratio h g  .  By this comparison we basically wanted to answer this question 
that: is the HGMP profitable compared to the alternative method? Fig. 12 shows the results of the implemented simulations for 
that purpose, as explained above. Thus, the answer is it depends to the ratio h g   and that’s why we ended up in having a criterion 
for the HGMP to be profitable. According to the results, for 0.2h
g


 , the HGMP has distinct advantage in terms of 
t  over the 
alternative model for any value of 
maxq . Further, the HGMP still remains advantageous for 0.6
h
g


 . Consequently, it is economic 
to employ the HGMP for the stated dynamic problem if and only if we utilize hunter and gatherer agents that satisfies 0.6h
g


 . 
In other word, if we employ two robots from different types as hunter and gatherer such that the hunter’s cost for following a 
certain path is less that 0.6 of the gatherer’s cost for following the same path, then employing the HGMP will be profitable. 
Considering the USAR example, the hunter can be a small UAV, while the gatherer should necessarily be a heavy duty UGV. If 
we consider the cost as the power consumption, then easily this 0.6h
g


  criterion will be satisfied.  
A screen capture video of the simulation results can be found as a supplementary material along with this paper, by using the 
YouTube link “youtu.be/HJuiP5DMZfo”, or by scanning the following QR code. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Inspired by the problem of “MRTA in an unknown environment”, we proposed the idea of task allocation based on coupling and 
cooperation between complementary teams in a hunter and gatherer scheme. Furthermore, this work presented distributed 
reasoning mechanisms relying on the notions of certainty and uncertainty profit margins in which levels of confidence and 
conservativeness are modeled, while an effective multitask-planning algorithm for gatherers is proposed that allows them to queue 
multiple tasks for finding the optimal solution for completing a group of tasks rather than doing one by one. By comparing the 
proposed hunter and gatherer scheme with an alternative method, where there is only one type of agent doing both exploration and 
completion of tasks together, we established a criterion to judge profitability of the proposed method. Examining the real world 
problems mentioned earlier confirms that the profitability criterion is reasonably satisfiable. We also found that extreme behavior 
of an agent, being too confident or too conservative, hurts the total effectiveness of the mission. Furthermore, statistical analysis 
demonstrates a significant improvement of total effectiveness effected by multitask-planning algorithm. However, while 
computational complexities for execution of the multitask-planning algorithm manifolds by increasing the size of an agent’s queue 
size, the total effectiveness of the HGMP does not increase linearly. 
 
Fig. 12.  Comparing the HGMP with an alternative model where each agent does both exploration and completion together. 
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Future work will consider the problem of adjusting the scaling parameters by an agent during a mission to achieve the optimal 
performance from both agent and team point of view. We also intend to develop a multi-robot exploration algorithm based on the 
notions of profit margins in the context of dynamic MRTA problems and investigate the effect of different multi-robot exploration 
algorithms on the HGMP.  
 
 
Funding and Data Release Notes 
This research was supported by Lamar University via internal grants. The readers are encouraged to contact the authors for any 
data and source code. 
REFERENCES 
[1] R. R. Murphy, Disaster Robotics. the MIT Press, 2014. 
[2] H. Kitano, S. Tadokoro, and I. Noda, "RoboCup Rescue: search and rescue in large-scale disasters as a domain for 
autonomous agents research," presented at the IEEE SMC '99 Conference Proceedings, Tokyo, Japan, 1999.  
[3] A. Bechar and C. Vigneault, "Agricultural robots for field operations: Concepts and components," Biosystems 
Engineering, vol. 149, 2016. 
[4] J. N. K. Liu, M. Wang, and B. Feng, "iBotGuard: an Internet-based Intelligent Robot security system using Invariant Face 
Recognition against intruder," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C (Applications and Reviews), 
vol. 35, no. 1, 2005. 
[5] T. Theodoridis and H. Hu, "Toward Intelligent Security Robots: A Survey," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, Part C (Applications and Reviews), vol. 42, no. 6, 2012. 
[6] M. Dunbabin and L. Marques. (2012) Robots for Environmental Monitoring: Significant Advancements and Applications. 
IEEE Robotics & Automation. 15.  
[7] K. Jose and D. K. Pratihar, "Task allocation and collision-free path planning of centralized multi-robots system for 
industrial plant inspection using heuristic methods," Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 80, pp. 34-42, 2016. 
[8] L. E. Parker, "Multiple Mobile Robot Systems," in Springer Handbook of Robotics, S. B. and K. O., Eds. Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2008. 
[9] B. P. Gerkey and M. J. Mataric, "Multi-Robot Task Allocation: Analyzing the Complexity and Optimality of Key 
Architectures," presented at the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Taipei, Taiwan, Taiwan, 
2003.  
[10] L. Luo, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara, "Provably-Good Distributed Algorithm for Constrained Multi-Robot Task 
Assignment for Grouped Tasks," IEEE Transactions on Robotics vol. 31, no. 1, 2015. 
[11] L. Huang, Y. Ding, M. Zhou, Y. Jin, and K. Hao, "Multiple-Solution Optimization Strategy for Multirobot Task 
Allocation," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, 2018. 
[12] R. Simmons, D. Apfelbaum, W. Burgard, D. Fox, and M. Moors, "Coordination for Multi-Robot Exploration and 
Mapping," in IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE AAAI NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 
Austin, United States, 2000: AAAI. 
[13] M. J. Matarić, G. S. Sukhatme, and E. H. Østergaard, "Multi-Robot Task Allocation in Uncertain Environments," 
Autonomous Robots, vol. 14, no. 2-3, 2003. 
[14] A. Zhu and S. X. Yang, "A Neural Network Approach to Dynamic Task Assignment of Multirobots," IEEE Transactions 
on Neural Networks, vol. 17, no. 5, 2006. 
[15] J. Turner, Q. Meng, and G. Schaefer, "Distributed Task Rescheduling With Time Constraints for the Optimization of 
Total Task Allocations in a Multirobot System," IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, vol. pp, no. 99, 2017. 
[16] D. Zhu, H. Huang, and S. X. Yang, "Dynamic Task Assignment and Path Planning of Multi-AUV System Based on an 
Improved Self-Organizing Map and Velocity Synthesis Method in Three-Dimensional Underwater Workspace," IEEE 
Transactions on Cybernetics vol. 43, no. 2, 2013. 
[17] T. S. Dahl, M. Matarić, and G. S. Sukhatme, "Multi-robot task allocation through vacancy chain scheduling," Robotics 
and Autonomous Systems, vol. 57, no. 6-7, pp. 674-687, 2009. 
[18] S. Marangoz, M. F. Amasyalı, E. Uslu, F. Çakmak, N. Altuntaş, and S. Yavuz, "More scalable solution for multi-robot–
multi-target assignment problem," Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 113, pp. 174-185, 2019. 
[19] K. Lerman, C. Jones, A. Galstyan, and M. J. Matarić, "Analysis of Dynamic Task Allocation in Multi-Robot Systems," 
International Journal of Robotics Research (IJRR), vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 225-241, 2006. 
[20] S. Liemhetcharat and ManuelaVeloso, "Weighted synergy graphs for effective team formation with heterogeneous ad hoc 
agents," Artificial Intelligence, vol. 208, 2014. 
[21] A. C. Chapman, R. A. Micillo, R. Kota, and N. R. Jennings, "Decentralised Dynamic Task Allocation: A Practical Game–
Theoretic Approach," in The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Budapest, 
Hungary, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 915-922  
[22] N. Michael, M. M. Zavlanos, V. Kumar, and G. J. Pappas, "Distributed Multi-Robot Task Assignment and Formation 
Control," presented at the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2008.  
  
17 
[23] S. Sariely and T. Balch, "Efficient Bids on Task Allocation for Multi-Robot Exploration," in Proceedings of the 
Nineteenth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Melbourne Beach, Florida, USA,, 2006. 
[24] D. Wu, G. Zeng, L. Meng, W. Zhou, and L. Li, "Gini Coefficient-based Task Allocation for Multi-robot Systems With 
Limited Energy Resources," IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica, vol. 5, no. 1, 2018. 
[25] P. M. Shiroma and M. F. M. Campos, "CoMutaR: A framework for multi-robot coordination and task allocation," 
presented at the IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, St. Louis, MO, USA, 2009.  
[26] A. Prorok, M. A. Hsieh, and V. Kumar, "The Impact of Diversity on Optimal Control Policies for Heterogeneous Robot 
Swarms," IEEE Transactions on Robotics, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 346 - 358, 2017. 
[27] B. P. Gerkey and M. J. Matari´c, "A Formal Analysis and Taxonomy of Task Allocation in Multi-Robot Systems," 
International Journal of Robotics Research (IJRR), vol. 23, no. 9, 2004. 
[28] E. Nunes, M. Manner, H. Mitiche, and MariaGini, "A taxonomy for task allocation problems with temporal and ordering 
constraints," Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 90, 2017. 
[29] R. R. Murphy et al., "Search and Rescue Robotics," in Springer Handbook of Robotics, B. Siciliano and O. Khatib, Eds. 
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008. 
[30] D.-H. Lee, S. A. Zaheer, and J.-H. Kim, "A Resource-Oriented, Decentralized Auction Algorithm for Multirobot Task 
Allocation," IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering, vol. 12, no. 4, 2014. 
[31] D.-H. Lee, "Resource-based task allocation for multi-robot systems," Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 103, pp. 
151-161, 2017. 
[32] N. Sullivan, S. Grainger, and B. Cazzolato, "Sequential single-item auction improvements for heterogeneous multi-robot 
routing," Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 115, pp. 130-142, 2015. 
[33] M. J. Osborne, An Introduction To Game Theory. USA: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 560. 
[34] S. Russell and P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 3rd Edition. Pearson, 2010. 
[35] Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown, Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. New 
York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
[36] D. C. Montgomery, G. C. Runger, and N. F. Hubele, "Engineering Statistics," 5th Edition ed. New York: Wiley, 2010, 
pp. 272-281. 
[37] B. Yamauchi, "Frontier-based exploration using multiple robots," in Proceedings of the second international conference 
on Autonomous agents, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, 1998, pp. 47-53 ACM  
 
